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Abstract: Can a human society be constrained in such a way that self-organization will 
thereafter tend to produce outcomes that advance the goals of the society? Such a society 
would be self-organizing in the sense that individuals who pursue only their own interests 
would none-the-less act in the interests of the society as a whole, irrespective of any 
intention to do so. This paper identifies the conditions that must be met if such a self-
organizing society is to emerge. It demonstrates that the key enabling requirement for a self-
organizing society is ‘consequence-capture’. Broadly this means that all agents in the 
society must capture sufficient of the benefits (and harms) that are produced by their actions 
on the goals of the society. ‘Consequence-capture’ can be organized in a society by 
appropriate management (systems of evolvable constraints) that suppress free riders and 
support pro-social actions. In human societies these constraints include institutions such as 
systems of governance and social norms. The paper identifies ways of organizing societies 
so that effective governance will also self-organize. This will produce a fully self-organizing 
society in which the interests of all agents (including individuals, associations, firms, multi-
national corporations, political organizations, institutions and governments) are aligned 
with the interests of the society as a whole. 
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1. Introduction 
Is it possible to constrain a society in such a way that self-organization within the society 
will always tend to produce outcomes that further the collective goals of the society?  
Consider a society which has a primary goal of providing some conception of ‘the good 
life’ for its citizens, and maintaining this in the face of internal and external challenges. Is 
there a way to constrain the society so that actions that produce ‘the good life’ will tend to 
self-organize within the society, and contrary actions will not?  It is worth noting here that 
in order for such a society to be fully self-organizing in this sense, the constraints that 
organize it would also have to be self-organizing. 
Before addressing this question, it is necessary to clarify the use of the term ‘self-organize’ 
in this context. ‘Self-organization’ as a concept has been used in different ways in different 
contexts and fields, often with little understanding of what it entails. But my usage here is 
broadly consistent with the approach taken in the study of Complex Adaptive Systems. In 
that field, self-organization is generally said to occur when larger-scale order or 
organization is produced by the interactions of agents that pursue only their own immediate 
interests [1, 2]. This self-organization occurs even though the agents may have no intention 
of producing it. Furthermore, the wider-scale organization that emerges is not produced by 
the intervention of some centralized controller that plans the specific outcomes it wants and 
then specifies the particular behaviours that are necessary to produce these outcomes. 
Consistent with this usage of the term ‘self-organization’, market-based economic systems 
in human societies are often given as examples of self-organizing processes. They are 
typically contrasted with centrally-planned command economies [3]. In an appropriately-
governed economic market, the pursuit by individuals of their immediate interests can 
benefit other participants in the market, irrespective of whether the individuals have any 
intention or desire to do so. This form of self-organization in human economic systems is 
often referred to as an ‘invisible hand’ process [4]. 
Drawing on these understandings of ‘self-organization’, the term ‘self-organizing society’ is 
used here to refer to a society in which the pursuit by members of the society of their 
immediate self-interest would none-the-less also advance the collective interests and goals 
of the society, whatever they may be. It is worth emphasizing here that in order to qualify as 
a self-organizing society, this condition would also have to apply to members of the society 
who are involved in establishing and adapting governance and other institutions. In other 
words, the pursuit by these members of the society of their immediate interests would 
establish institutions that advance the interests and goals of the society as a whole.  
Using the terminology of the ‘invisible hand’, a self-organizing society is one in which 
invisible hand processes are not restricted to the functioning of appropriately-managed 
markets. In a self-organizing society, invisible hand processes would operate in all domains, 
ensuring for example that institutions would also serve the common good (including by 
managing markets appropriately). In other words, the satisfaction of needs and wants that 
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cannot be met by economic markets would none-the-less be satisfied by other invisible hand 
processes. 
It is clear that modern human societies are not self-organizing societies in the sense used 
here:  outcomes that most would consider to be socially undesirable are often produced in 
modern societies when their own immediate interests are pursued by individuals, 
businesses, corporations, political organizations and other agents. For example: 
(a) Far from serving only the common good, economic markets also self-organize 
undesirable outcomes including financial crises and environmental damage, even though 
no market participants may intend to produce these outcomes. 
(b) Powerful interests influence governments to act in ways that advance private interests at 
the expense of outcomes that would be more beneficial for the society. 
(c) Significant proportions of humans live and die without their fundamental needs and 
desires being met effectively or fairly. Nor do they have the opportunity to develop fully 
their potential to contribute positively to society. 
(d) The pursuit by various groups of their individual interests can produce wars and 
conditions that facilitate wars, including the possibility of nuclear annihilation. 
(e) Large-scale criminal activities emerge and exploit opportunities to advance the interests 
of their participants at the expense of societal interests through theft, manipulation, fraud, 
etc. 
(f) Corporations and other business interests are able to find many ways to advance their 
interests without producing goods and services that efficiently satisfy the genuine needs 
and desires of others, including through dishonesty, monopoly power, tax avoidance, anti-
competitive practices, the manipulation and distortion of desires through advertising, etc. 
(g) Politicians, political parties, bureaucrats, governmental bodies and others involved in 
establishing governance in modern societies find many ways to advance their own 
interests in ways that do not benefit the society. 
The fact that typical modern societies are not self-organizing can also be demonstrated by 
showing that they lack key features that would arise in self-organizing societies. For 
example, modern societies lack the following characteristic that would emerge in a society 
in which the pursuit of self-interest would always tend to advance the common good: 
(a) Corporations and other businesses that have no concern at all for the environment or for 
ethical behaviour would none-the-less act ethically and protect the environment. 
(b) Politicians, political parties and governmental bodies would not have to be courageous, 
of good character or have political will in order to motivate them to act and govern in 
the interests of the society as a whole. Instead, the pursuit of societal interests would be 
the easy, self-interested thing for them to do. 
(c) All members of the society would spend their lives helping others, even though they 
might not care about anyone else. 
(d) Actions that contribute to the initiation of war within a self-organizing global society 
would be against the interest of corporations, political groups, and all other members of 
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the society. In fact, it would be as much against their interests as war is against the 
interests of those whose lives are destroyed by it. 
(e) Just as invisible hand processes currently ensure that some market processes serve 
societal goals, invisible hand processes would do the same for all the systems that 
establish governance and that undertake the other functions currently performed by 
governments. 
(f) The society would be self-repairing and self-correcting in relation to any damage to its 
effective functioning. 
(g) All power would be used in the interests of the society as a whole, whether it is 
possessed by individuals, corporations, governments or political groups. 
(h) The development of better programs to help the disadvantaged fulfil their potential to 
contribute to society could be even more profitable and attractive to investors than 
developing a popular new breakfast cereal. 
This brings us back to the key questions posed and addressed by this paper: is it possible to 
constrain a human society so that it is self-organizing in the sense discussed here?  And if 
so, how? 
In answering these questions, it is very useful to draw on the growing body of knowledge 
about how self-organizing societies of living organisms have emerged many times during 
the evolution of life on Earth [5, 6]. For example, societies of self-producing molecular 
processes emerged to produce simple cells; societies of simple cells produced eukaryote 
cells; societies of these cells emerged to produce multi-cellular organisms; and societies of 
these emerged to produce animal societies. Human evolution displays a similar pattern in 
which societies of increasing scale have emerged progressively:  e.g. from kin groups to 
bands, to tribes, to city states, to nation states etc. In each of these instances, the societies 
which emerge at each step are formed of entities that previously lived independently and 
competed with each other. These entities are themselves smaller-scale societies that 
emerged previously in evolution. Furthermore, as we will see in more detail, all these 
societies that emerged in past evolution are self-organizing societies in the sense discussed 
here, with the exception of recent human societies. 
For example, consider a multi-cellular organism such as yourself. You are a highly complex 
society comprised of trillions of cells. You are constituted by many more cells than there 
are humans on the planet. None of your individual cells knows anything of you, nor do any 
of them have any concern for your goals or interests. Each of your cells pursues its own 
immediate interests. It does only what cells do:  acting on its cellular impulses, needs and 
volitions. Yet your cells produce you in all your complexity:  your walking, talking, 
thinking and other functions. And as your cells adapt to their local circumstances in 
accordance with their immediate interests, they produce your adaptations and your 
achievements. How does this happen?  We will use an understanding of how this has 
emerged to understand the conditions that must be met if human societies are also to be 
self-organizing. 
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Section 2 of the paper sketches a general model of the emergence of societies/organizations 
that are self-organizing in the sense developed here. In developing the model, Section 2 
draws on the growing body of knowledge about how self-organizing societies of living 
organisms have emerged many times during the evolution of life on Earth. Section 2 goes 
on to use the model to identify how a society needs to be constrained if it is to be self-
organizing, and to understand the processes that have driven the emergence of such 
societies during past evolution. 
Section 3 draws on this general model to identify how self-organizing human societies can 
be developed, with particular focus on the establishment and adaptation of requisite 
institutions. 
2. The Evolution and Emergence of Self-Organizing Societies of 
Organisms 
2.1 Consequence-capture 
This section uses an agent-based approach to develop a general model of the evolution of 
self-organizing societies. I begin by sketching a simplified model and then proceed to show 
how this simple model can be adapted to account for key features of the emergence of self-
organizing societies at any level of organization. 
Consider a population of agents that compete with each other to survive and persist. Agents 
can be self-producing molecular processes, proto-cells, prokaryote cells, eukaryote cells, 
multi-cellular organisms, animal societies, human tribes, corporations, nation states etc. 
Agents have a capacity to discover adaptations that can enhance their competitiveness. The 
nature of the mechanisms that adapt agents are not restricted—they can include processes as 
disparate as gene-based natural selection and psychological mechanisms. Ultimately agents 
compete to survive, but proximately they may compete to acquire psychological benefits, to 
increase profits or to otherwise increase utility. 
Importantly, agents have the potential to interact with each other in ways that can impact on 
their competitiveness. Here we will explore the circumstances in which patterns of 
interaction between some agents within a population may emerge and be reproduced 
through time. Such a self-producing, self-maintaining pattern of entities and their 
interactions (relationships) would constitute an emergent organization within the larger 
population. 
Actions taken by an agent that impact on other agents will not be adaptive for the agent 
unless the benefits it captures exceed the costs that it incurs. Actions that fail to produce net 
benefits to the agent will therefore not persist or be reproduced, and will not be part of any 
emergent organization. This is the case no matter how beneficial an action may be for the 
survival of the organization as a whole. 
However, when an action benefits others and when the agent initiating the action captures 
sufficient of those benefits to outweigh the costs of the action, the competitiveness of the 
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agent and of the other beneficiaries can both be enhanced. As a result, the relationships 
constituted by such actions will tend to be reproduced within the population. A self-
producing/self-sustaining proto-organization will tend to emerge in a population whenever 
some agents capture sufficient of the benefits of their actions that also benefit other agents. 
In summary, the general condition for the emergence and persistence of a proto-
organization is ‘consequence-capture’—i.e. that agents capture enough of the benefits and 
harms of the impacts of their actions on others and on the organization as a whole to sustain 
them at an optimal level [6-11]. If this condition is met continually within an organization, 
it will constitute a self-organizing organization in the sense developed here:  any action 
which an agent discovers that contributes net benefits to the organization as a whole will be 
adaptive for the agent and will be reproduced as part of the organization. The adaptive 
interests of the individual members of the organization will be aligned with the global 
adaptive interests of the organization. Agents that pursue their own interests successfully 
will therefore also be pursing the organization’s global interests. Agents will tend to adapt 
(and where applicable, evolve) in ways that improve the functionality of the organization as 
a whole. Through the adaptation of the agents that constitute it, the organization as a whole 
will be able to explore the space of cooperative organization, restricted only by the 
adaptability and evolvability of its agents. As we will see in greater detail, if this condition 
is not met the possibility space that can be explored by the proto-organization will be 
seriously limited, and the proto-organization will not be capable of open-ended evolution. 
Many forms of organization that contain highly beneficial cooperation will not be 
realizable. 
It is worth emphasising here that these conclusions apply to all forms of self-organization 
involving living entities. These include the emergence of larger-scale order, patterns, 
structure and other forms of coordinated, global activity: if the emergent phenomena rely 
upon agents acting in ways that incur adaptive costs to them, the emergent pattern will not 
persist and be produced through time unless the agents capture sufficient benefits to 
outweigh those costs. 
It should be noted that throughout this discussion, references to capturing benefits and 
harms that flow from the actions of agents refers to the benefits and harms that arise at all 
relevant levels and scales. It may be useful in some circumstances to consider the benefits 
(and harms) that are captured as comprising both a ‘between-group’ component and a 
‘within group’ component (e.g. see [12]). 
But how difficult is it for comprehensive consequence-capture to be achieved?  And 
therefore how easily do organizations that are self-organizing in the sense developed here 
emerge in populations of living organisms?  If this emergence was straightforward, we 
would expect it to occur frequently in populations because such organizations would be able 
to exploit the significant adaptive benefits of synergy and other forms of cooperation. There 
is widespread agreement about the potential benefits of coordination, division of labour, 
collective action and other forms of cooperation [13-15, 6]. In principle, these potential 
benefits apply in relation to organizations of all kinds of organisms, including multi-species 
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assemblages. As a consequence, wherever such organizations emerge and persist, we would 
expect them to be strongly favoured by selection. This expectation is consistent with the 
evidence:  whenever complex organizations have emerged in the history of life, they tend to 
be extremely successful [16, 5, 6-11]. 
However, even though such organizations are successful once they emerge, they emerge 
only infrequently. It is the exception rather than the rule. In the history of life, it is 
extremely rare for a population of organisms to give rise to complex cooperative 
organization, despite its adaptive benefits. 
What are the reasons for this apparent impediment to the evolution of complex 
organizations?  Why does comprehensive consequence-capture emerge only rarely?  There 
is much research that helps answer this question. Due in part to interest in harnessing 
cooperation for human purposes, an extremely large body of research has focused on 
identifying the conditions that must be met if cooperation is to emerge amongst living 
processes [for overviews of particular parts of this literature see 17-21]. This research 
confirms that complex cooperative organization will emerge and persist only in limited 
circumstances [e.g. see 22-25]. 
I will draw upon this research to develop an understanding of impediments to the 
emergence of complex organization and to the achievement of consequence-capture. I will 
then build upon this research to examine how this impediment can be overcome in some 
circumstances through the emergence of special forms of organization that enable 
comprehensive consequence-capture and therefore enable the emergence of self-organizing 
societies. 
2.2 How consequence-capture can be organized 
This large body of research has identified a number of forms of organization that enable 
consequence-capture to some degree, at least in limited circumstances. Figure 1 diagrams 
three forms of organizational architectures that enable some consequence-capture under 
some conditions. These architectures can account for the overwhelming majority of 
circumstances in which simple forms of cooperative organization arise in populations, in 
theory and in nature. The architectures are applicable irrespective of the nature of the 
particular agents that comprise the population and apply at all levels of organization. 
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Figure 1 depicts each of these three architectures within a larger population of agents that 
are not organized. Each kind of agent is represented by a circle containing a letter. Each 
organizational architecture is enclosed by a dotted line. Arrows represent the flow of 
benefits in the relationships between agents within an architecture.  
Considering each organizational architecture depicted in Figure 1 in turn from the left: 
(a) In the first, each kind of agent captures some of the benefits it provides to the other 
when the other reciprocates. Note that the Figure also depicts a cooperative agent that 
provide benefits to a free-riding agent that fails to reciprocate. Specific examples of this 
architecture at various levels of organization include: 
1) Reciprocal altruism e.g. where two humans provide food to each other when the 
other has insufficient for its needs [26, 27]. 
2) Mutualism e.g. where individuals from two different species each benefit from 
an association with the other, such as bees that feed from the flowers they 
pollinate [28]. 
3) Mutual catalysis e.g. between two different kinds of RNA molecule that each 
catalyse the formation of the other [29]. 
(b) In the second, agents that are predisposed to provide benefits to other agents capture 
some of the benefits of doing so when those other agents disproportionately share the 
same cooperative pre-disposition (each of the agents in the architecture are labelled ‘A’ 
to indicate they each share the same pre-disposition). Note that not all agents that share 
the pre-disposition receive benefits, and some provide benefits to free-riding individuals 
that do not share the pre-disposition. Examples of this architecture include: 
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1) Kin selection in which co-operators associate disproportionately with other 
agents who are similarly pre-disposed because they are related and share similar 
genes e.g. in some species of birds, individuals might feed the offspring of 
relatives [30, 31]. 
2) The cultural equivalent to kin selection in which the shared pre-disposition to 
cooperate results from shared norms or customs (rather than shared genes) e.g. 
some human ethnic groups share a cultural pre-disposition to preferentially do 
business with other members of their ethnic group [6]. 
3) Population structures (including separation into groups) that cause co-operators 
to associate disproportionately with other co-operators, and where groups with 
higher levels of cooperation may outcompete other groups [12, 33]. 
4) Selective cooperation in which, for example, human individuals are pre-disposed 
to cooperate only with others who have a reputation for cooperating (and may be 
predisposed to punish individuals that cheat or otherwise free ride) [26-27, 33-
34]. 
(c) In the third, every agent that provides benefits to other members of the organization 
captures some of these because it is provided in turn with benefits by at least one other 
member of the organization. Note that some members of the organization provide 
benefits to free-riding individuals that do not contribute to the organization in return. 
Furthermore, one agent (J) contributes to the organization without being supported by it. 
Examples of this architecture at various levels of organization include: 
1) A self-producing autocatalytic set of proteins in which each protein (i) catalyses 
the formation of at least one other member of the set, and (ii) is in turn catalysed 
by at least one other member of the set [35, 29]. 
2) An RNA hypercycle which comprises a self-producing family of RNA 
molecules that each (i) catalyses the formation of an enzyme which in turn 
catalyses the formation of another member of the RNA family, and (ii) has its 
own replication catalysed by an enzyme produced by another member of the 
RNA family [36]. 
3) Indirect reciprocal altruism e.g. a band of humans in which each member 
performs favours for others, but a favour may be repaid by members who were 
not recipients of the original favour [27]. 
4) An ‘autocatalytic cycle’ in an ecosystem comprising for example, a predator, a 
herbivore and grasses. The predator benefits by feeding on the herbivore, it 
benefits by feeding on the grasses, and the grasses benefit from the recycling of 
nutrients produced by deaths of the predator and herbivore and by their faeces 
[37].  
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This classification of architectures can be further compressed by noting that the first 
architecture is a special case of the third. 
The reasons why these forms of organization are very limited in their capacity to realize the 
enormous adaptive advantages of complex cooperative organization are well known. In 
particular: 
(a) The capacity of the organizations to produce themselves through time is highly 
susceptible to undermining by free riders. Free riders are agents that take some of the 
adaptive benefits produced by the organization but who contribute nothing (or 
insufficient) in return (e.g. cheats, thieves and defectors). Because free riders do not 
bear the costs of contributing appropriately to the organization, they can out-compete 
those that do. Furthermore, their appropriation of collective benefits prevents members 
of the organization from capturing sufficient of the benefits of their contributions. As a 
consequence, agents that would contribute significantly to the success of the 
organization are unable to persist in the organization. In these circumstances, the 
emergence of more complex forms of organization is not possible, despite their 
enormous potential adaptive advantages [24-25, 38]. 
(b) These organizational architectures do not contain any features which guarantee that 
agents will capture sufficient benefits to sustain optimal contributions to the 
organization. The architectures ensure that some agents will capture some benefits. But 
the architectures do not necessarily match the level of benefits to the costs of the agent’s 
contributions. If complex cooperative organizations are to emerge, agents need to 
capture enough benefits to sustain their contributions at an optimal level, taking into 
account the costs of doing so [38, 6-9]. 
Due to these factors, the simple architectures that are generally invoked to explain the 
emergence of cooperative organization are unable to produce organizations or societies that 
are fully self-organizing in the sense developed here. 
Because agents within these simple architectures are often unable to capture sufficient of 
the benefits of their actions (or harms in the case of free riders), the organizational 
possibility space that they are able to explore is seriously limited. There are many forms of 
organization, especially complex forms, that cannot be realized even though they include 
cooperative relationships that are clearly advantageous. Selection operating at the level of 
the individual agent or at the level of the organization as a whole is unable to overcome this 
limitation. If a form of organization cannot be reproduced through time, selection cannot 
call it into existence. Self-organization of the relevant variation must come first, or selection 
is irrelevant. 
This is an observation that has significant consequences for understanding the evolution of 
living processes [6-7, 11]. But it is often not grasped fully. In evolutionary theorizing it is 
often accepted implicitly that the key challenge in any attempt to account for complex 
adaptation is to identify the selection pressures that have shaped and tuned it. This 
presumption works well when considering the evolution of organisms that are self-
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organizing, and are therefore capable of producing a more or less unlimited range of 
structures and functions on which selection can operate.  
But this approach is completely inadequate for explaining the initial emergence within 
populations of the complex organizations that eventually became organisms in their own 
right (e.g. the emergence of the cooperative organizations of simple cells that became 
eukaryote cells, the organizations of eukaryote cells that became multicellular organisms, 
and the organizations of organisms that became animal societies). The assumption that the 
relevant variation on which selection can act will eventually arise and persist, fails to hold. 
Here the key challenge is instead to understand how complex, self-organizing organizations 
emerged out of earlier organizations that were incapable of sustaining complex forms of 
organization i.e. that were unable to produce complex variants on which selection could act. 
Demonstrating plausible selection pressures that would favour more complex forms of 
organization does not advance the explanation very far if these complex forms of 
organization are incapable of being realized by the simpler organizational architectures that 
precede them. For these reasons, the origin of life and other major evolutionary transitions 
(in which new, complex, larger-scale entities emerge from cooperatives of smaller scale 
entities) cannot be accounted for by selection operating solely on the kinds of architectures 
sketched in Figure 1. For example, a number of researchers have set out to show how 
evolutionary transitions can arise in a straightforward fashion out of the evolution of 
autocatalytic sets of macro-molecules and their architectural analogues at higher levels of 
organization (i.e. the kinds of architectures on the far right in Figure 1). However, these 
attempts have been unable to demonstrate how these autocatalytic forms of organization can 
evolve complex cooperative arrangements (for various attempts see 29, 37, and 40-41. For a 
critique see 42). 
2.3 Architectures that provide for comprehensive consequence-capture 
Are there more complex architectures that can enable full consequence-capture and 
therefore overcome the limitations of the simpler forms of organization considered in the 
previous section? 
Stewart (6-11) demonstrates that the addition of a ‘manager’ (a system of evolvable 
constraints) to these simple architectures can achieve full consequence-capture. A manager 
is an agent or combination of agents that has the power to apply constraints across the 
simpler organization. These constraints can restrain or punish free riders that would 
otherwise undermine the organization. Constraints applied by the manager can also control 
the allocation of resources and other benefits within the organization. This enables the 
manager to ensure that agents that contribute to the success of the organization as a whole 
are supported optimally. By constraining free riding and supporting pro-social agents, the 
manager can ensure agents capture the consequences of their actions. Agents will therefore 
tend to adapt and evolve in ways that support the functionality of the organization as a 
whole. 
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A manager’s capacity to constrain (and therefore control) the organization also enables it to 
harvest sufficient of the benefits produced by its management to support its own 
reproduction through time. This means that a manager will tend to capture benefits (and 
harms) produced by its management. As a result, consequence-capture will also tend to 
apply to the manager. It will therefore be in the manager’s interests to manage the 
organization in ways that increase the effectiveness of the organization as a whole. The 
manager can best achieve this by ensuring that all other agents capture the impacts of their 
actions on the organization. The end result is that consequence-capture will tend to apply to 
all member of the organization, including the manager. This aligns the interests of the 
manager and all other agents with the interests of the organization as a whole. It produces a 
self-organizing organization in which any adaptations arising within the manager or other 
agents that enhance the success of the organization will tend to be supported and 
reproduced. 
In summary, simple, unmanaged cooperative organizations tend to emerge at every level of 
organization, but the organizational possibility space they can explore is seriously limited. 
However, appropriate management (systems of evolvable constraints) can correct the 
limitations in these organizations, massively expanding the organizational possibility space 
that can be explored and enabling the emergence of complex cooperative organization, 
including major evolutionary transitions. 
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Figure 2 sketches the architecture of a managed organization that is situated in a larger 
population of agents that are not organized. Each kind of agent is represented by a circle 
containing a letter. M is the powerful, evolvable manager. The normal arrows represent the 
flow of benefits between agents. The two dashed, bolded arrows that originate from the 
manager each represent the suppression of a free rider by the manager (each free rider takes 
benefits from other members of the organization but contributes nothing in return). Each 
suppressed free rider is marked with an X. The two bolded arrows (un-dashed) that 
originate from the manager each represent the provision by the manager of benefits to an 
agent that contributes to the organization but receives no benefits from other members of 
the organization (these agents would not persist in the organization if they were not 
supported by the manager, despite their positive contributions to the organization). The two 
thick black arrows pointing towards the manager represent the appropriation of benefits 
from the organization by the manager. 
Examples of managed organizations at various levels of organization include: 
(a) RNA (and eventually DNA) management of proto-cells. In early cells RNA 
management used its catalytic capacity to: (i) suppress side reactions and other free-
riding metabolic processes that utilize the cell’s resources without contributing to the 
functionality of the cell; (ii) support processes that contribute positively to the 
functioning of the cell but would not otherwise be reproduced within the cell; and (iii) 
support processes that assist management’s own maintenance and reproduction. The 
threshold between chemistry and life was passed when RNA management took over 
proto-metabolisms and massively expanded the organizational possibility space that 
they could explore. 
(b)  Management of a modern corporation by an effective CEO. The CEO uses her or 
his power to manage the corporation by: (i) punishing and firing staff who free ride by 
failing to contribute sufficiently to the success of the corporation; and (ii) resourcing 
and incentivizing staff to the extent that the staff contribute to the effective functioning 
of the organization. 
(c) Governmental management of a nation state. The government uses its power to 
manage the state by, for example: (i) punishing any free-riding citizens who don’t pay 
appropriate taxes; (ii) using some of the taxes it raises to fund an army for the defence 
of the nation and to fund other activities that benefit the nation as a whole; and (iii) 
using some taxes to support the functioning and maintenance of the government itself. 
In these three examples, the manager is external to the agents that are being managed. But 
Stewart also shows how management can also be instantiated by evolvable systems of 
constraints that are internal to agents, as well as by combinations of internal and external 
management. Internal constraints can control agents by pre-disposing them to behave in 
particular ways. These constraints can control an organization if they are reproduced within 
each of the agents that constitute the organization. Because such a set of constraints 
(collectively constituting the manager) can pre-dispose any member of the organization to 
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act in particular ways, it is able to reach across and manage the entire organization. Because 
the manager is reproduced in each member of the organization, it will capture all the 
benefits (and harms) experienced by each member and by the organization as a whole. The 
manager will therefore be subject to consequence-capture, potentially meeting the key 
requirement for a self-organizing society. This consequence-capture will tend to align the 
adaptive interests of the manager with those of the organization as a whole. 
Figure 3 depicts the architecture of an organization managed by ‘distributed internal 
management’: 
 
Figure 3 sketches the architecture of an organization controlled by internal distributed 
management. Each kind of agent is represented by a circle containing a letter. Agents that 
include the bundle of predispositions that constitute the manager are marked with a bolded 
M. The managed organization is encircled by a dotted line. Normal arrows represent the 
flow of benefits between agents. All members of the organization contain the manager and 
cooperate with other members. There are two free riders depicted by circles marked F. The 
bolded arrows represent the suppression of free riders by a number of agents that contain 
the manager. Each suppressed free rider is marked with an X. 
Examples of organizations managed by distributed internal management include: 
(a) Management of a proto-multicellular organism by distributed internal genetic 
elements:  An organization of cells can be managed by genes that are reproduced in 
each of the cells that constitute the organization. Because this genetic manager is 
included in each cell within the organization, it can pre-dispose cells to punish and 
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suppress free riders such as mutants or invading cells that do not contain the manager. It 
can also pre-dispose cells to provide optimal resources to cells that contribute to the 
functionality of the organization as a whole. 
(b) Management of a human tribe by distributed internal norms and other cultural 
pre-dispositions:  A tribal society can be managed by norms and customs that are 
reproduced (internalized by socialization) in each member of the tribe. Such a manager 
can pre-dispose members of the tribe to punish or exclude any free-riding individuals 
who have failed to internalize norms that would otherwise have predisposed them to 
contribute to the success of the tribe. The manager can also pre-dispose members of the 
tribe to provide optimal support for members who, for example, specialize in providing 
useful services for the tribe, such as weapon making. This management by cultural 
constraints is likely to co-evolve with genetic management that comprises pro-social 
genetic pre-dispositions that are also distributed across the members of the tribe [6]. 
Even though distributed internal management arises ‘bottom up’ without any centralized 
external control, it operates in the same way as external management, and has the same 
effect on agents. It is equally constraining and controlling. However, where distributed 
internal management operates, it is not possible to perceive its management directly. This 
can lead to the misperception that the order it enables has emerged spontaneously without 
the involvement of any form of control at all. But agents that are managed by distributed 
internal management are not more free than those controlled by external management. In 
fact, they can be less free to innovate than individuals in externally-managed societies. This 
is because distributed internal management can only evolve and adapt when ‘mutations’ 
arise in the pre-dispositions that are hard-wired in all members of the society.  But any 
‘mutant’ individuals that are predisposed to act differently to other members of the society 
in ways that are socially significant will tend to be treated as free-riders and strongly 
suppressed [6]. Within organizations such as human tribal societies that were managed by 
distributed internal management, life for social innovators whose inventions contravened 
established norms tended to be nasty, brutish and short [61]. The difficulties facing social 
innovators also apply to some degree in human systems that are managed by a combination 
of distributed internal management and external management, such as those studied by 
Ostrom [43]. 
Whether management is instantiated by distributed internal management or external 
management or by a combination, consequence-capture will ensure that agents adapt and 
evolve in ways that enhance the functionality of the organization as a whole. But as 
mentioned in Section 1 above, this functionality itself will not necessarily be self-
organizing. Whatever form of organization best serves the goals of the organization will 
arise and persist in a society which is self-organizing in the sense developed here. Top-
down solutions will compete with bottom-up ones, mechanistic forms of organization will 
compete with more flexible and adaptable forms, and processing that is more or less 
distributed will compete with processing that is more or less centralized. The arrangements 
that win in one situation may change as circumstances and contexts change. If we use the 
organization of the human body as a guide to what kinds of outcomes might prevail, we can 
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reasonably expect that a mix of all these forms of organization and processing will be called 
into existence in a complex society. Economic markets also point to a similar conclusion. 
They contain a wide mix of organizational types. In both the human body and in economic 
markets, no form of organization seems to be the most effective in all circumstances. For 
example, top-down processing often seems to prevail for systems that adapt organizations 
for what Beer [44] refers to as the outside/future—i.e. for interactions between the 
organization as a whole and its environment and/or in relation to future events. In these 
circumstances’ most agents in the organization will not have the information they would 
need if they were to adapt directly for the outside/future. They will therefore need to have 
this information fed to them through some form of top-down processing. The way in which 
the brain functions in relation to the human body is a clear example. It is worth emphasizing 
that top-down processing does not necessitate rigid, prescriptive organization. Top-down 
control can be organized by enabling rather than prescriptive constraints, particularly where 
the members of the organization are sufficiently evolvable and adaptable in their own right 
[11]. As a further example of the contingent nature of organizational effectiveness, even 
flexibility and adaptability does not appear to be optimal in many circumstances. For 
example, where there is certainty and predictability, forms of organization that are relatively 
rigid and mechanistic can perform more effectively and efficiently than forms that waste 
resources on unnecessary exploratory activities, provided some residual adaptive capacity is 
retained. 
2.4 Institutions and management 
The systems of evolvable constraints that constitute management are generally termed 
‘institutions’ in human societies. This terminology is consistent with North’s observation 
that: 
Institutions are the rules of the game in society or, more formally, are the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction. [45] 
These constraints can arise from governance or other external sources, or from internal 
genetic and/or culturally-inculcated predispositions such as norms, or from combinations of 
both. The key characteristic of constraints in this context is that they can influence without 
being influenced in return [46].  If they could be influenced in return, they would not be 
able to control the behaviour of individuals and the distribution of resources within a 
society. This is because free riders and other individuals would be able to escape their 
influence. This capacity to constrain enables institutions to modify the interests of members 
of the society and to align them with those of the society as a whole. 
In a self-organizing society, the constraining-power of institutions is used to implement 
consequence-capture, including in relation to the processes that establish and adapt 
institutions. Effective institutions in a self-organizing society ensure that when entities 
within the society (including individuals, corporations and governments) pursue their 
immediate self-interest, they will advance the goals of the society. As a consequence, it will 
be advantageous to entities to act in ways that advantage the society. In other words, in a 
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self-organizing society institutions enable the self-organization of whatever patterns of 
behaviour serve the interests of the society as a whole. In short, institutions enable ‘the 
good’. Importantly, this includes enabling the self-organization of whatever institutions are 
needed to further the interests of the society through the implementation of consequence-
capture. A hierarchy of institutions will self-organize, ensuring that entities involved in the 
establishment and adaptation of institutions act in ways that serve societal interests. As a 
result, in a self-organizing society new institutions will tend to arise wherever consequence-
capture does not apply—e.g. where there are conflicts of interest and/or interests that are 
not aligned with those of the society. As we shall discuss in the next section, when we 
evaluate institutions in current human societies against these standards, we find that many 
are highly ineffective. Institutions in modern societies often serve interests other than those 
of the society as a whole. 
3. How can Self-Organizing Human Societies Be Organized? 
The model sketched in Section 2 enables us to see broadly how human societies must be 
constrained if they are to be self-organizing. Management/institutions (i.e. systems of 
evolvable constraints) are needed to ensure that all agents in the society (including 
individuals, associations, businesses, corporations, politicians, political parties, institutions 
and governments) capture sufficient of the benefits (and harms) of their impacts on the 
goals of the society. Such management/institutions will align the interests of agents with 
those of the society as a whole. Agents that pursue their own immediate interests will 
therefore act in ways that also provide global social benefits, whether or not agents have 
any intention of doing so. Agents will adapt and evolve in ways that provide functionality 
for the society as a whole. Such a society will be self-organizing in the sense developed 
here. 
What are the more detailed implications of this broad framework for how modern human 
societies might be re-organized so that they are self-organizing in the sense used here?  In 
order to address this question, it is useful to begin by developing an understanding of the 
systems of management/institutions that have emerged during the evolution of human 
societies, and by identifying where they fall short of producing comprehensive 
consequence-capture. 
3.1 The rise of externally-managed human societies 
The earliest human societies (bands and simple tribes) were managed almost exclusively by 
systems of distributed internal constraints [6]. These were in the form of genetic and 
cultural constraints that pre-disposed individuals to behave pro-socially. Typically, this 
involved pre-disposing individuals to act cooperatively toward others who were also 
constrained by the same internal distributed manager (i.e. by the same bundle of pre-
dispositions), and to punish or exclude others who were not (e.g. cheats, thieves and other 
free riders). For example, individuals in a tribe might have been socialized to internalize 
norms that pre-disposed them to reciprocate in exchange relations within the tribe and to 
punish individuals that cheated in exchanges [33]. 
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External management emerged fully in human evolution only with the formation of larger 
societies such as agricultural communities, city states and kingdoms. Distributed internal 
management alone was not effective as a coordinator of behaviour across these societies. At 
least in part this was because of the unreliability of socialization as a mechanism for 
reproducing norms and other pre-dispositions across large numbers of people, often from 
different cultural backgrounds. Furthermore, as mentioned above, distributed internal 
management is less evolvable than external management in these circumstances [6]. The 
powerful rulers of these societies could manage more effectively, applying and adapting 
constraints in the form of governance that, for example, punished free riders and raised 
taxes to fund armies to defend the society and sometimes to plunder other societies. 
Nevertheless, pro-social genetic and cultural pre-dispositions continued to play an important 
role in constituting institutions which managed interactions at the local level within these 
early externally-managed societies. They continue to do so in modern societies, particularly 
within sub-cultures. Furthermore, the rise of large empires and nations was greatly assisted 
by the emergence of ‘world religions’ that were capable of entrenching some pro-social 
norms across groups with different cultural backgrounds. These religions typically attempt 
to inculcate followers with broad injunctions that facilitate fairness, honesty and trust in 
economic and other social relations—e.g. ‘to do unto others as you would have them do 
unto you’ [47]. 
However, the significance of the systems of distributed internal constraints that were 
entrenched by religion has diminished somewhat in modern western societies with the rise 
of rationalism. The influence of religion was increasingly undermined as rationalism began 
to become more widespread with the emergence of the European Enlightenment. As a 
consequence, modern human societies have had to rely increasingly on external 
management in the form of governance to ensure that entities within it capture the benefits 
and harms of their impacts. These systems of governance include laws and associated 
enforcement processes, the raising of taxation, and the use of taxes to fund goods and 
services that are not provided by economic markets. The role of some of these institutions is 
particularly important because they enable the emergence of the dynamic webs of exchange 
relations that constitute economic markets. When it is effective, this governance enables 
exchange relations to flourish by punishing theft and cheating, including by enforcing 
contracts. In modern human societies the governance needed to underpin economic markets 
includes elaborate systems of laws, policing functions, courts and penalties. Without this 
complex and adaptable external management, modern large-scale economic markets would 
not emerge [48]. 
3.2 The lack of alignment between the interests of management and the interests of the 
society 
In summary, external management predominates in modern human societies, but our 
societies still include diverse systems of distributed internal management that continue to 
play important roles in constituting institutions. However, as we saw in Section 1, modern 
human societies are not self-organizing in the sense developed here. In the context of the 
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model sketched in Section 2, we can now see that this is because the systems of 
management in modern societies fail to fully align the interests of entities with those of the 
society. In order to understand why this is so and what could be done to change it, it is 
useful to look again briefly at the self-organizing organizations that have emerged during 
past evolution at lower levels of organization. These non-human organizations exhibit 
comprehensive consequence-capture and alignment of interests. We can explore why they 
succeed where modern human societies fail. Importantly we will find that this exploration 
points to how modern human societies could be re-organized and constrained so that they 
become fully self-organizing. 
Stewart [6-11] shows that in non-human organizations, managers are likely to first emerge 
as powerful agents that plunder organizations of entities. Under favourable circumstances, 
these powerful agents may discover profitable ways to harvest an on-going stream of 
benefits from an organization, rather than exploit and plunder it only once. This begins the 
alignment of interests between the proto-manager and the organization it manages. The 
alignment is strengthened as managers discover how to constrain the organization in ways 
that increase the productivity and survivability of the organization (e.g. by promoting useful 
cooperation). This alignment will be further strengthened once the manager is obligatorily 
tied to one organization and cannot move between them (i.e. so it is no longer able to avoid 
the consequences of any over-exploitation of the organization). Full alignment will be 
achieved when competition between managed organizations within a population ensures 
that any action taken by the manager that is contrary to the interests of the organization will 
be strongly selected against i.e. poorly-managed organizations will be out-competed and 
eliminated from the population. In these circumstances, the only way the manager will be 
able to advance its own interests is by applying constraints which advance the interests of 
the organization as a whole. 
But full alignment is obviously not a feature of modern human societies. Individuals and 
organizations that constitute management/institutions in human societies can often advance 
their own interests to some degree at the expense of the society. The most significant reason 
for this is the absence of strong competition and selection at the level of human societies. 
This is a consequence of the absence of a large population of human societies that are in 
strong competition with each other for limited resources. There are fewer than 200 
sovereign countries on the planet today. If circumstances producing strong competition did 
exist, societies whose managers were relatively ineffective would be out-competed and 
quickly eliminated from the population. Ineffective managers include those that exploit 
their society by appropriating more of the resources of the society for themselves and their 
supporters than is optimal.  
In modern human societies, weak competition and selection at the level of societies can 
allow governments and the interests they serve to get away with exploitative and ineffective 
management. As a result, powerful interest groups are able to co-opt the power of 
government to further their own interests at the expense of the society, including by 
distorting and manipulating the framework of institutional constraints that are essential if 
economic markets are to operate efficiently [49-53]. This weakness of competition and 
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selection has progressively worsened in the most recent 10,000 years of human evolution as 
the scale of human societies has increased and the numbers of human societies has 
progressively decreased. It will peak if the trend continues and eventually leads to the 
emergence of a single human society on the scale of the planet. 
But the solution is not to reduce the scale of human societies and to promote fierce 
competition between them. More effective and efficient ways to re-align the interests of 
government with those of the society have begun to emerge during the recent evolution of 
human societies [6]. These arrangements that have begun to emerge are internal to the 
society itself. They operate by constraining the agents, processes and systems that establish 
and adapt the governance and other institutions of the society. The effects of these ‘meta-
constraints’ is to begin to achieve the same outcomes through intra-societal processes that 
strong competition and selection would achieve between societies—i.e. to implement intra-
societal processes that begin to align the interests of governance with the interests of the 
society as a whole by ensuring that management captures the benefits and harms of the 
impacts of its actions on society. 
An early step in the development of these intra-societal arrangements was the signing of the 
Magna Carta in Britain in 1215. For the first time, the king himself was made subject to the 
laws of the land. These laws constrained the king to act in ways that were beneficial to 
some degree to some of the other interests in the society (it was a small, first step). 
Representative democracy was a further major step in the emergence of internal constraints 
on governance. It ensured that the individuals who were given the primary power to 
establish and adapt governance were subjected to regular election by members of the 
society. 
3.3 The limitations of democracy as a method for constraining 
management/governance 
The democratic systems in place in the world today have gone some way towards 
constraining governments so as to align their interests with those of citizens. But they fall 
far short of doing so comprehensively. In part this is because citizens are not the only 
interests in society who are attempting to constrain governments to act in their interests. 
Other key players include individuals who have accumulated much more of the societies’ 
resources and wealth than is necessary to sustain their positive contributions to the society 
(e.g. various kinds of free riders). These interests have powerful incentives to influence 
governments to allow them to maintain and expand their wealth and power. Furthermore, 
the royal road to riches in managed human societies has always been to co-opt the power of 
government to distort economic markets and other aspects of society in your favour. The 
wealthy and powerful are generally the best-positioned within society to take advantage of 
this principle. They have the incentive and the means to manipulate governments for their 
own ends [25-29]. This has long been recognized by economists with an interest in 
institutions. For example, Adam Smith wrote when talking of businessmen: 
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The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this 
order, ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be 
adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most 
scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men, 
whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally 
an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, 
upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it. [4] 
And more recently, Nobel Prize winner Douglas North wrote: 
Institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather 
they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the 
bargaining power to devise new rules. [45] 
Just as the wealthy and powerful pursue their immediate self-interest in economic markets, 
they also purse their immediate self-interest to influence governments to establish 
institutions that serve their interests. But unlike in ideal economic markets, there is as yet no 
invisible hand to ensure that their pursuit of self-interest in their manipulation of 
governance will also serve the common good. 
But why cannot citizens use their power at the ballot box to ensure governments only act in 
the interests of the majority of citizens?  Firstly, this power is very weak. It is typically only 
exercised every three or four years. Furthermore, voters do not have the power to impose 
their choices separately in relation to each of the multitudes of initiatives that governments 
will undertake in their period of office. Instead, voters only have the power to choose one of 
a very small number of alternative packages of initiatives (often only two political parties 
have a realistic chance of gaining office). They have no option but to take the bad with the 
good, and may end up agreeing with only a small proportion of the package of proposed 
initiatives that they vote for. They cannot pick and choose initiatives out of each package. 
It is worth imagining how unresponsive and ineffective economic markets would be if they 
operated under similar principles—i.e. if consumers had to purchase all their goods and 
services in advance for a four-year period through a collective decision that is able to 
choose just one of only two or three packages of goods and services. If economic markets 
were as restricted and limited in these ways as political markets, they would not have given 
rise to the enormous diversity of goods and services tailored to individual needs and wants 
that we see in modern societies. They would be just as incapable of aligning the interests of 
producers and consumers as are current democratic systems at aligning the interests of the 
governors with the interests of the governed. 
This weakness in the capacity of citizens to constrain their governments in modern 
democracies leaves ample space for the wealthy and powerful and other interests to 
influence and manipulate governments for their own ends. Those who have grown wealthy 
and powerful under the existing organization of society are well-placed to manipulate 
government. They can use their wealth and power directly to corrupt the government. But in 
sophisticated modern societies they can use means that are far more subtle. Wealthy owners 
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of mass media who share common interests with other powerful individuals use their 
control over public debate to influence voter’s decisions. Mass media have a strong hand in 
determining what public issues will be treated seriously, what opinions will be repeatedly 
published and which will be taken as authoritative. They also largely control the extent to 
which the background, actions and motivations of politicians are critically scrutinized, and 
the extent to which their failings are brought to the attention of the public [49, 52]. 
The wealthy and powerful are also in a position to co-opt governments and the mass media 
to use war, hatred and fear to manipulate voters. It has long been recognized that many 
citizens forget their preference for a cohesive, caring and fair society when they believe that 
their way of life is under serious threat from enemies or other crises, whether internal or 
external [51, 52]. As Plato pointed out during the dawn of democracy in ancient Greece, 
citizens will overlook almost any failings of government if their society is at war, either 
against other states or against other races, ethnic groups or religions within the society [54]. 
A politician’s dream has always been a war that can never end, such as an internat ional war 
against terrorism. 
The manipulation of citizens in modern democratic societies is greatly assisted by the 
existence of a significant proportion of citizens who have not yet reached the level of 
cognitive development that began to spread more widely with the European 
Enlightenment—i.e. broadly the formal operations level identified by Piaget [55]. Even in 
modern industrialized societies, only about 30 per cent develop this level of cognitive 
capacity. The remainder are at Piaget’s concrete operations level at best [55-57]. As such, 
these citizens do not have an independent capacity to use abstract ideas and principles to 
judge and evaluate the motivations and effects of the actions of government. Unable to 
think abstractly for themselves, they have to rely on the thinking of ‘reputable authorities’. 
And they do not have the capacity to assess for themselves which of these authorities are, in 
fact, reliable. 
The manipulation and distortion of governmental activities is further assisted by the 
extreme centralization of control over governance in modern societies. The enormous 
power of government to intervene in and control all aspects of society is in the hands of 
typically a few hundred individuals for three or four years at a time. If sufficient of these are 
influenced and controlled, the society is controlled. 
But none of this is to say that governments and voters are controlled and manipulated by 
some kind of organized conspiracy. This control and manipulation self-organizes out of the 
individual interests of the wealthy and powerful. Individuals simply act in accordance with 
their own perceived wider interests. Their wider interest is often as simple as maintaining 
the status quo of governance and policies that have enabled them to accumulate their wealth 
and power. There is no central body that plans and directs strategies designed to advance 
the collective interest of the wealthy and powerful. And because the collective action that 
emerges amongst the wealthy and powerful self-organizes from individual interests, it is 
also limited and undermined to some extent by the impediments to collective organization 
outlined in Section 2 [24]. For example, individuals are unlikely to invest significant 
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resources in pursuing the collective interest where they capture insufficient of the benefits 
to cover their investments. And various forms of free riding can be expected to be rife (there 
is no honour amongst thieves). But nonetheless, in large part due to the centralization of 
government and the influence of mass media, the ease with which government and voters 
can be manipulated enables this flawed self-organization of collective power to be relatively 
effective. 
3.4 New approaches to aligning the interests of management with those of the society 
How could modern societies be re-organized and constrained to overcome these problems? 
The general understandings developed here about how to produce a self-organizing society 
point to a way forward. These understandings suggest a method for diagnosing whether a 
society or any of the sub-systems or processes within the society will self-organize in the 
interests of the society. Where this diagnosis reveals that the sub-systems and processes will 
fail to self-organize appropriately, these understandings also suggest in general terms what 
must be done to rectify the situation. It identifies the actions that can be taken to re-organize 
the sub-systems and processes so that they henceforth self-organize ‘the good’, as the 
society defines it. 
In relation to diagnosis, the fundamental investigation to be undertaken is this:  do all 
relevant agents (including agents that are organizations of agents, such as corporations) 
capture sufficient of the benefits (and harms) of their actions to ensure that pro-social 
actions will be reproduced optimally in the society?  If all relevant agents pursue their own 
immediate interests, will they act in the interests of the society as a whole? The 
investigation needs to identify all situations and circumstance in which the interests of any 
specific agents conflict with societal interests. 
In any particular instance, this investigation must also be undertaken in relation to agents 
and processes that establish and adapt relevant governance and other institutions. This is 
likely to require an examination of the relevant government agencies and associated 
processes as well as politicians and political processes. Whether consequence-capture 
applies must be assessed for all agents and processes, including those involved in 
management. 
Where such an investigation reveals that particular agents and processes do not capture 
sufficient of the relevant benefits and harms, systems of adaptable governance and other 
institutions need to be put in place to ensure that they do. This will involve embedding all 
relevant individuals, businesses and other agents in systems that provide them with a pattern 
of incentives, disincentives and other constraints which align their interests with societal 
goals. Incentives may include direct funding, opportunities to make profits, salaries, career 
advancement and psychological benefits. Disincentives may take the form of penalties, 
sanctions, loss of financial benefits and taxes (e.g. taxes on carbon emissions). Other 
constraints can include laws, regulations, rules and associated enforcement processes. In 
circumstances where local information is important, management will not be prescriptive 
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about what agents should do. Instead it will set goals and allow agents to discover the best 
ways of achieving them, taking into account local circumstances [11]. 
Taken together, these systems of incentives, disincentives and other constraints would 
ensure that the social consequences of the actions of all relevant agents are fed back to 
them. This would ensure that the only way agents can satisfy their own immediate interests 
is to serve ‘the good’. 
Of course, if this approach is to be fully self-organizing in the sense developed here, the 
agents and processes that put in place this new management (including the agents involved 
in undertaking the initial investigation which assesses whether new management is 
necessary), must also be governed and managed so that they are subject to consequence-
capture, as do the processes that put them in place, and so on, with ultimate closure at the 
level of the constitution. A hierarchy of management is necessary, with each level 
constraining the one below and constrained by levels above. 
In many situations, there will be uncertainty about the particular form of management that 
will be optimal and which should be implemented. For example, uncertainty might result 
from the complexity of the circumstances or lack of relevant information. Where this is the 
case, decisions about governance and management will generally be more effective if they 
are made by processes that are distributed and adaptable, rather than made centrally by an 
individual or agency [6, 11]. Effective decisions about management would not be made by 
individuals or by government agencies, but by processes constituted by many agents, 
possibly competing with each other to develop the best decisions. These distributed 
processes would need to be organized so that agents within them capture the benefits and 
harms of their actions i.e. they also would be self-organizing or ‘invisible hand’ processes. 
However, an approach that sets out to develop a self-organizing society using this kind of 
diagnosis and re-organization on a piecemeal, ‘sub-system by sub-system’ basis would be 
expected to encounter strong resistance. This would come from any powerful interests that 
would be affected adversely by each initiative. If each step in such a piecemeal approach to 
reform were to be successful, it would have to begin by appropriately constraining the 
powerful interests that were threatened by it. Attempts to reform an entire society by such a 
step-by-step approach could also begin strategically by commencing with areas of 
governance where the impact on powerful interests was least. However, such a strategy 
would likely soon be detected by those interests, and opposed. 
3.5 Alignment of interests through vertical markets 
An alternative to a reformist, piecemeal approach would be to attempt to implement a self-
organizing society in ‘one fell swoop’ (this might be possible for example, in times of crisis 
where possibility space is considerably expanded. For more detailed discussion about how a 
political movement might be developed that could take advantage of such circumstances to 
move towards a self-organizing society, see Stewart [58]). 
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How would such a society need to be organized?  What would it look like as a functioning 
whole?  Is it possible to envisage new systems for establishing governance and other 
institutions that would be capable of producing comprehensive consequence-capture so that 
the society would thereafter function and maintain itself as a self-organizing whole? 
We can begin to answer these questions by first developing an understanding of the 
strengths and weakness of economic markets. In particular, an understanding of how 
markets can operate as self-organizing systems will enable us to see how the processes that 
establish institutions could also be structured so that they are self-organizing. 
Appropriately-managed economic markets are able to incentivize the production of an 
extraordinary diversity of goods and services that are able to satisfy a wide range of human 
needs and wants. Economic markets achieve this by utilizing webs of competitive exchange 
relations which enable agents to capture benefits from the provision of goods or services 
that satisfy the needs of others. Exchange relations are key to the self-organizing capacity of 
markets. They enable market participants to capture benefits by helping others who they 
may never meet. They enable comprehensive consequence-capture for the satisfaction of 
the needs and wants that economic markets can service efficiently. It is this characteristic of 
markets that has unleashed exponentially-increasing creativity, innovation and investment 
in recent centuries. 
But there are many needs and wants that economic markets are unable to address. Economic 
markets provide consequence-capture for the satisfaction of only a subset of human 
preferences and desires. For example, the exchange relations that constitute markets can 
operate effectively only for goods and services whose benefits are discrete and can be 
enjoyed only by the purchaser. If this central condition is not met, free riders will be able to 
enjoy the benefits of a good without paying. This will prevent the producer from capturing 
sufficient of the benefits generated by such a ‘public good’. Other market failures can also 
undermine the capacity of economic markets to provide appropriate consequence-capture 
for some goods and services, including where there are natural monopolies, principal-agent 
problems, time-inconsistent preferences, externalities, information asymmetries, and so on. 
As a consequence, economic markets can fail to provide efficiently a range of goods and 
services that are necessary to satisfy particular human needs and wants, including:  the laws 
and other institutions that enable effective economic markets to emerge in the first place 
(including the constraints that are needed to deal with externalities such as those that drive 
global warming); the goods and services needed by those who do not have sufficient 
purchasing power in the economic market; the infrastructure and constraints needed to 
underpin flourishing and satisfying communities; environmental protections; aspects of 
education and other initiatives designed to develop the full potential of all citizens to 
contribute to the society; defence; law creation and enforcement; initiatives to promote 
effective forms of internal distributed management within society such as trust and pro-
social norms;  solutions to collective action problems; the provision of services that tend to 
be local monopolies; other sets of constraints that can assist in ensuring consequence-
capture; and many other functions currently performed by governments. 
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Taking this context into account, a key challenge that can be posed in relation to current 
human societies is this:  how can societies be re-organized so that the satisfaction of all 
needs and desires (including collective needs) tends to be addressed optimally by self-
organizing (invisible hand) processes?  Stewart [7, 9, 6] shows how this can be achieved by 
what he terms a ‘vertical market’. This is a web of competitive exchange relations that 
enable consequence-capture for ‘products’ that satisfy the needs and wants that are not able 
to be addressed by economic markets (i.e. by horizontal markets). The basic element of a 
vertical market is an exchange relation in which public goods, institutions and other forms 
of governance are ‘purchased’ by the collectives that benefit from them. Entrepreneurial 
‘producers’ compete to offer ‘products’ for sale to collectives. Through the sale of these 
‘products’, entrepreneurs capture social benefits produced by the public goods, institutions 
and other services they develop. Collectives decide whether to purchase a particular 
component of governance using for example, a voting process. If the decision is made to 
buy the good, the members of the collective are required to contribute appropriately to the 
purchase (overcoming the free-rider problem at the level of the collective). This compulsory 
contribution to a collective purchase is a counterpart of taxation in current societies. 
Both vertical and economic markets are complex webs of exchange relations in which 
producers compete to satisfy the preferences of consumers. But it is worth emphasizing here 
two fundamental differences between vertical and horizontal markets: 
(a) First, the products exchanged in vertical markets differ in an important respect from 
those exchanged in economic markets. A key feature of these products is that they 
usually provide benefits to collectives rather than to individuals, often unavoidably so. 
In contrast, goods and services that are exchanged effectively in a horizontal market are 
products whose benefits can be restricted to the specific agent that purchases them. 
Many of the goods and services currently provided by governments are examples of 
components of governance and public goods that cannot be purchased in economic 
markets. Numerous examples have been given above, and include the complex 
framework of regulations and other constraints (i.e. the institutions) that enable both 
horizontal and vertical systems of exchange relations to emerge and operate in the 
interests of society. 
(b) Second, each exchange that occurs in a vertical market is between a ‘producer’ and the 
collection of agents that benefits from the component of governance that is being 
exchanged. In contrast, each exchange in an economic market is between a producer and 
an individual agent that solely enjoys the benefits of the good. This feature of vertical 
markets is of critical importance to their successful operation. If an effective system of 
exchange relations is to emerge, all of the agents who enjoy the benefits of an instance 
of a product must be involved in its purchase so that the producer can capture sufficient 
of the benefits provided by the good. 
To ensure this condition is met in vertical markets, purchasing decisions need to be 
made by the collection of agents who will enjoy the benefits of a particular component 
of governance that is on offer. An important part of the framework of vertical markets 
will be processes that identify the constituents of the relevant collective in any instance. 
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In cases where the benefits of a public good or other component of governance are 
enjoyed by everyone in a society, the collective that decides whether to purchase the 
good will comprise all citizens. But the collective will be smaller where the good 
benefits only a subset of the society—e. g. where the product is a training scheme 
designed to correct the under-provision of training in an industry that results from the 
inability of individual employers to capture sufficient of the benefits of training they 
provide to their employees. In this example, the relevant collective will be the 
employers in the industry. If the collective decides to buy the scheme, all employers will 
be taxed to fund it in proportion to the net benefits they receive. By way of a further 
example, where the product is governance that restrains environmental harms, the nature 
of the collective that benefits from the governance will depend on the scale and location 
of the environmental harms. Some products may also have negative impacts on other 
agents. In these cases, the framework that regulates the vertical market could require the 
producer to enter into an exchange relation with the collective that experiences the 
negative consequences in order to ameliorate the harmful impacts. The hierarchical 
systems of regulation and other constraints that provide the framework for the operation 
of a vertical market would themselves be established and adapted through the vertical 
market system. 
Through vertical markets, collectives would be able to purchase goods and services that are 
directed at satisfying needs and wants that cannot be adequately addressed by economic 
markets. The combination of vertical and horizontal markets would enable comprehensive 
consequence-capture for those involved in producing goods and services designed to satisfy 
the full range of human wants and need. The result would be a society in which actions 
directed at satisfying all human needs would tend to self-organize. Vertical markets would 
replace the functions performed by centralized government. Because vertical markets are 
distributed rather than centralized, they would be far less susceptible to manipulation by 
powerful interests, enabling much closer alignment of interests between the ‘producers’ and 
‘consumers’ of public goods and other elements of governance. 
Other key features of a vertical market system include: 
(a) Entrepreneurs would be able to capture benefits from their investment in the 
development and production of better institutions and other forms of governance. This is 
a critically important feature of vertical markets that distinguishes them from current 
democratic systems. Because entrepreneurs who develop and implement products for 
the vertical market would be able to capture these benefits, they would find it profitable 
to make large investments in research and development where these are necessary to 
realize the huge benefits that can flow from better institutions and governance. In 
relation to improvements in governance, this would unleash the same kind of 
exponentially-increasing innovation that we see in economic markets. 
This capacity of vertical markets also distinguishes them sharply from proposals to 
introduce new forms of democracy which are more distributed, including proposals for 
e-democracy that take advantage of recent developments in information and 
communication technologies (e.g. see [59]). In these proposals, citizens would be able 
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to vote directly on each of a wide range of policies and other aspects of governance, 
including proposals that can be developed by citizens themselves. These ‘hyper-
democratic’ schemes contain a number of advantages over current forms of democracy. 
However, they also contain a serious impediment. They lack market processes that 
allocate appropriate levels of resources and investment to the development of innovative 
proposals for new public goods and other elements of governance. As we have seen, 
they share this deficiency with current forms of democracy. This impediment arises 
because any individual will only capture a small proportion of the potentially huge 
benefits that can flow to a society from more effective governance. Free riding will 
undermine collective efforts. As a consequence, individuals will not have the incentive 
to make the significant investments that may be needed to research and develop better 
forms of governance (a classic example of a collective action problem). Our current 
systems typically provide much greater rewards and resources for the development of a 
tastier breakfast cereal or ice cream than for the development of better market 
regulation. 
Hyper-democratic schemes that do not contain self-organizing processes that 
allocate optimal levels of resources for the development of public goods and other forms 
of governance are seriously limited. They would be as ineffective as economic markets 
that were limited in a similar way. Imagine an economic market that did not allocate any 
resources to entrepreneurs for the development of innovative products and services. 
Instead it left it to consumers to develop new products and services. If economic 
markets were as limited as democratic systems in this regard they would never have 
produced the great diversity of goods and services that flood the modern marketplace. 
Proper resourcing of product development is the engine of innovation and creativity in 
both vertical and horizontal markets. 
(b) Every unmet (or inefficiently met) need in a self-organizing society would be a profit 
opportunity in either a vertical or horizontal market. Because entrepreneurs could 
capture the benefits of their contributions, they would be incentivized to seek out and 
rectify any loophole in governance or deficiency in existing public goods. And as 
changing circumstances render particular elements of governance sub-optimal, 
entrepreneurs would profit from adapting governance to the new conditions. 
Corporations that found ways to game the system would create profit opportunities for 
entrepreneurs who devise ways to counter them. Entrepreneurs would be able to profit 
from identifying and correcting free-riding, uncaptured harms, inefficient governance, 
governance that fails to make effective use of emerging technological advances, agents 
that capture greater benefits than are appropriate given their contributions to society, the 
manipulation and distortion of governance and markets, and so on. As they respond to 
these opportunities, entrepreneurs would serve the interests of the members of the 
society even if they were motivated to pursue only their own immediate interests. 
Societies with effective vertical markets would therefore be self-organizing, self-
repairing, self-improving, and self-adapting. 
(c) Vertical markets would also be self-evolving. This is because the framework and 
regulation of a vertical market are also products that could be purchased in the vertical 
market. Everything in a vertical market would therefore be contestable and evolvable, 
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including the institutions of the vertical market itself. Any valid criticism of any aspect 
of a vertical market would not be fatal to the vertical market. It would instead point to a 
profit opportunity associated with the correction of the deficiency. 
As mentioned already, the regulation of horizontal economic markets would also be 
dealt with by the vertical market. Vertical markets would incentivize the development of 
regulations and other constraints that would prevent powerful interests from distorting 
and biasing economic markets in their favour. The full potential of economic markets to 
satisfy human needs within their limited domain could only be fully realized once the 
governance that manages them is as adaptable, innovative and creative as the products 
produced by economic markets. 
The vertical market system would be a meta-market (a market in markets, both 
vertical and horizontal). It would ‘decide’ which particular needs would be addressed by 
products exchanged in vertical markets and which by horizontal markets, and how this 
might change as circumstances change. 
(d) Individuals would not be overwhelmed by the demands of decision making in the 
vertical market. They would be free to choose which particular vertical market 
transactions they became involved in personally (if any). Where they choose not to be 
involved, they could delegate their vote to processes that utilize collective intelligence 
such as citizen juries or citizen deliberative councils, or delegate their vote to other 
citizens or even to representatives (e.g. see [60]). The vertical market could be expected 
to respond to the diverse needs and preferences of citizens by providing a wide array of 
options for decision making. 
The important point is that citizens would be able to delegate their decision making 
to processes that are far more intelligent and knowledgeable than they are. This would 
be critical to the effectiveness of vertical markets. The ability of a vertical market to 
establish and adapt appropriate governance would depend in large part on the 
competence of the decisions made by or on behalf of citizens. The ability to delegate 
decision making to processes that are more intelligent would also help overcome one of 
the key deficiencies in current democratic systems:  as mentioned earlier, in existing 
systems the wealthy and powerful can take advantage of and exploit the cognitive 
limitations of many voters. 
(e) As it does in economic markets, competition between ‘producers’ in the vertical market 
would drive the alignment of interests between ‘producers’ and ‘consumers’ of 
governance ‘products’. Competition would tend to ensure that ‘producers’ would benefit 
only to the extent that they could best satisfy the interests of the collectives that are the 
‘consumers’ in a vertical market. Also as in economic markets, this competition would 
be intensified and creativity would be maximized by allowing open access to the 
vertical market:  any individual, business, corporation or other organization would be 
able to assume the role of an entrepreneur who develops and offers new ‘products’ in 
the vertical marketplace. 
(f) The combination of vertical and horizontal markets would tend to call into existence 
whatever arrangements would optimally satisfy the preferences of the members of the 
society, subject to resource and other constraints. Economic markets alone cannot go 
anywhere near achieving this. 
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(g) A vertical market would not eliminate governance and other forms of management. 
These are ineradicable features of self-evolving societies at all levels of organization. 
They are essential if citizens are to capture the benefits and harms produced by the 
impact of their actions on the goals of the society. However, the vertical market could 
be expected to constrain management so that it achieves its goals in ways that minimize 
restrictions on the freedom of citizens and other agents. 
(h) The vertical market would ‘decide’ what kinds of organization are established within the 
society to serve the society’s goals. As discussed earlier, self-organizing societies in 
general have no intrinsic preference for particular forms of organization. Whatever forms 
of organization will best serve the interests of the society in the prevailing circumstances 
can be expected to prevail. However, as the intelligence and evolvability of members of 
societies has increased during the evolution of life, there is a clear trend towards forms of 
organization that are less prescriptive and that better utilize the creativity of their 
members. This is evident in human evolution—the rise of market-based societies is due 
in part to their ability to enable a much higher proportion of citizens to engage in 
innovation and creativity than do feudal societies, for example. 
Of course, it would not be necessary to implement a fully-fledged vertical market system all 
at once. Instead, a vertical market system could be introduced in a phased, step-by-step 
manner. If, for example, the starting point was a typical modern society with a system of 
representative democracy, a vertical market could be established initially to adapt only a 
small sub-set of governance, or even just a single aspect of governance (the burgeoning 
expansion of ‘special district governments’ in the United States that is outlined by Clarke 
[61] can be interpreted as a step in this direction).  Additional systems of governance could 
be added to the vertical market progressively over time. Of course, as for any step-by-step 
approach, powerful interests could be expected to oppose and distort any moves to 
implement even a very limited vertical market that threatened their interests. A first step in 
any such approach would therefore need to involve constraining those interests 
appropriately. 
3.6 The need for global management/institutions and a planetary self-organizing society 
 
A vertical market system operating within a society has the potential to ensure consequence-
capture within the society. However, it would not ensure consequence-capture for actions that 
have impacts outside the society, including interactions with other societies. More 
specifically, even if each nation on Earth were a self-organizing society with full internal 
consequence-capture, cooperation between nations would still be impeded. Thieving between 
states (i.e. war) and other forms of free riding would continue to undermine the ability of 
nations to cooperate together even when it would benefit them and their citizens. Nations 
would not capture the benefits or harms of the impact of their actions on other nations. 
The absence of consequence-capture at the international level can produce serious problems, 
particularly where there are uncaptured environmental harms such as those caused by 
excessive carbon emissions. In the case of global warming, businesses and other agents do 
not currently capture in full the global harms caused by their release of greenhouse gasses 
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into the atmosphere. As a consequence, global warming is self-organizing apace. But any 
nation that attempts to stop this by ensuring that its businesses and other agents capture these 
global harms will be disadvantaged relative to nations that do not. Such a nation will fail to 
capture the benefits of taking this action. In contrast, free-riding nations that fail to restrain 
the carbon emissions of their corporations and other businesses will be advantaged—their 
businesses will be able to out-compete those in other nations that are not free-riding [62]. 
For these reasons, a system of global management is essential if the citizens of the world and 
all other agents (including nations) are to capture sufficient of the benefits and harms of their 
impacts on others [6, 11]. An appropriate system of global governance and other global 
institutions is necessary to align the interests of individuals, organizations, businesses, 
corporations, politicians, governments and all other agents with the interests of global society. 
This would ensure that when agents within the global society purse their own immediate 
interests, they will also serve the goals of humanity as a whole. The result would be a self-
organizing society on the scale of the planet. 
The general principle here is that if ‘the good’ is to self-organize, consequence-capture must 
apply over all relevant scales of space and time. 
4. Conclusion 
We have seen that it is possible to organize a human society in such a way that actions 
which advance the goals of the society will tend to self-organize. In such a self-organizing 
society, individuals and other agents that seek only to pursue their immediate interests will 
also advance the societal interest. Importantly (and fortunately for humanity), a society does 
not have to comprise agents who want to serve the interests of the society in order for the 
society to produce ‘the good’. 
We have learnt from an examination of self-organizing societies that have emerged 
previously during the evolution of life that the key to organizing such a society is 
consequence-capture. All members of the society must capture sufficient of the impacts of 
their actions on the society as a whole. This can be achieved by sets of evolvable constraints 
that I have termed ‘management’. In human societies these sets of constraints are 
commonly referred to as institutions. Management constrains the society to prevent free 
riding and to support contributions to the goals of the society. Unconstrained or 
inappropriately-constrained self-interest can destroy a society. Appropriately constrained 
self-interest will produce a society in which ‘the good’ tends to self-organize. 
In the absence of consequence-capture the ‘possibility space’ for a society is seriously 
limited. There will be many actions and processes that are beneficial to the society that will 
not emerge and that will not be sustainable within the society. This is because agents will 
not capture sufficient of the benefits that would accrue from investing resources in these 
actions and processes. Furthermore, agents that do invest in these actions and processes will 
tend to be out-competed by free riders that do not. 
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These considerations point to an important principle for dealing with problems and 
challenges in human societies. It is not enough to devise a technical solution to any 
problem. The solution will not be implementable unless relevant agents capture sufficient of 
the benefits of doing so. Any attempt to solve a complex societal challenge should therefore 
always begin with the meta-question:  will all relevant agents experience sufficient 
consequence-capture as they search for and implement an appropriate solution?  If they will 
not, the problem is likely to be insoluble in practice. If they will, self-organization will tend 
to ensure that agents search possibility space for an optimal solution, implement the best 
that is found, and adapt the solution as circumstances change. Provided appropriate 
enabling institutions which ensure consequence-capture are in place, the relevant agents can 
often be left alone to solve the problem without further intervention (note that these 
considerations apply equally to strategies designed to establish a self-organizing society). 
If a society is to be self-organizing, consequence-capture must also apply to agents that are 
involved in establishing and adapting management. This challenge is particularly important 
for modern human societies. In contrast to non-human societies at lower levels of 
organization, selection at the level of modern societies is often not strong enough to fully 
align the interests of management with those of the society. Human societies must therefore 
develop processes internal to the society that align interests in this way. We explored 
piecemeal approaches to achieving this, as well as a general approach that can be applied to 
the society as a whole. The general approach involves the establishment of a vertical 
‘invisible hand’ process to complement the horizontal ‘invisible hand’ of economic 
markets. A key goal of vertical markets is to develop systems for establishing governance 
and other institutions that are as innovative, distributed, dynamic, collectively intelligent 
and self-organizing as are ideal economic markets (we noted that ideal economic markets 
will not often be achieved in practice without effective vertical markets:  if economic 
markets are to serve the interests of society, they must be well-managed). 
Without the forms of organization outlined here, modern human societies will continue to 
fail to self-organize ‘the good’. Instead they will continue to harness most of the wealth and 
resources of the society to satisfy the needs and goals of only a tiny proportion of the 
population (e.g. see [63]).  
As the history of the twentieth century demonstrates, past attempts to change this outcome 
have been futile. Even if revolution manages to overthrow existing power structures and 
elites, in the absence of the kinds of fundamental changes to the organization of society that 
are envisaged here, self-organization tends to produce similar power structures and elites 
again. George Orwell’s Animal Farm illustrates these processes of self-organization very 
effectively [64]. The repeated failure of movements that have been directed at building a 
better world is due largely to their inability to envisage how society can be successfully 
reorganized so that it henceforth inexorably self-organizes ‘the good’. 
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